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Economies in transition and in development:
A possible warning from Adam Smith
Maria Pia Paganelli
1. Introduction
Adam Smith was concerned with the nature and causes of economic growth
and development. One may therefore ask if it is possible to use his work,
even if only as speculation, in order to gather useful insights about today’s
developing or transitional economies. With all the due caveats, this paper
asks: if Adam Smith were alive today, what would he say about transitioning
and developing economies? Testing whether Adam Smith would be correct
in his analysis, I leave to other work.
Asking Adam Smith, even if only hypothetically, about transitioning and
developing economies adds to the existing literature, which focuses mostly
on market-building and/or institution-building.1 Formal incentives and
calculations, deriving from markets or institutions, are necessary but not
sufficient to understand the problems of transition and development (and
to suggest solutions). Knack and Keefer (1997) and Paul Seabright (2004),
among others, recognise it and add social trust to the picture; James
Coleman (1988), Robert Putnam (2006) and Amos Witztum (1994, 2008),
among others, add social capital and social attitudes. Adam Smith (1759,
1776) would add vanity and our desire to gain approbation.
Smith’s analysis is based on the belief that we have a variety of
motivations. Among other things, we are moved by an innate desire to be
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praised by others. The desire to better one’s condition, which follows us
from the cradle to the tomb, is in fact an expression of our desire to gain
approbation. The more riches we have, the more we are able to show off;
and the more we show off, the more approbation we receive.2
It is because mankind is disposed to sympathize more entirely with our joy than with
our sorrow, that we make parade of our riches, and conceal our poverty . . . [I]t is
chiefly from this regard to the sentiments of mankind, that we pursue riches and
avoid poverty . . . From whence, then, arises . . . that great purpose of human life
which we call bettering our condition? To be observed, to be attended to, to be taken
notice of with sympathy, complacency, and approbation, are all the advantages which
we can propose to derive from it. It is the vanity, not the ease or the pleasure, which
interest us. . . . Vanity is always grounded upon the belief of our being the object of
attention and approbation. The rich man glories in his riches, because he feels that
they naturally draw upon him the attention of the world. . . . The poor man, on the
contrary, is ashamed of his poverty. He feels that it either places him out of the sight
of mankind, that if they take any notice of him, they have, however, scarce any fellow-
feeling with the misery and distress which he suffers. (TMS I.iii.2.1: 50–1)
In Smith’s framework, therefore, man does not live by bread alone:3 we
may have the most beautiful rule and/or institution, but if there is an
opportunity to improve our image in the eyes of others, we are willing to
break the rule and ignore the institution.
In the next section, I will show in detail how, for Smith, the prospect
of acquiring large amounts of wealth, because of the large gains in
approbation that follow, may give us strong enough incentives to disregard
moral and formal rules. This may become a problem when there are large
amounts of wealth that can be gained. In his time, Smith saw the sudden
abundance of wealth associated with the opening of the New World’s
markets and the monopoly privileges granted to deal in them. Likewise,
today he would see the sudden abundance of wealth commonly associated
with the opening of Western markets or with the giving of foreign aid to
some transitioning and developing countries. In the following section, I will
present how Smith identifies rent-seeking, public bankruptcy and factions
as pernicious consequences of our vain desire to be approved, combined
with this sudden abundance of wealth. Likewise, today he would identify
similar kinds of problems afflicting some transitioning and developing
economies. The final section elaborates on a possible way Smith would
propose to develop a free and prosperous society – gradual introduction of
commerce. A slow exposure to great riches may generate smaller profit
2 Smith also tells us that we sympathise with sorrows and poverty as well as with joy
and wealth. Thanks to a referee for pointing this out.
3 Cf. Hirschman (1997), who collapses vector rewards into scalar in Adam Smith’s
work.
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opportunities, which, in turn, would generate both weaker rent-seeking
opportunities and better odds of developing a sense of trust and
cooperation that is strong enough to resist the temptation of grabbing
new available wealth. Concluding remarks end the paper.
2. A Smithian framework for analysing some problems in some
transitioning and developing economies
Smith believes that we are motivated by an innate desire to gain the
approbation of others. Our vain desire to gain approbation motivates us to
work hard and produce more and better goods. This desire is the driving
force of economic betterment. It is a benign force that supports the
working of the invisible hand, the benefits of which we are so familiar with4.
But this same desire may not always be benign. Smith explains that there
are two ways in which we gain approbation: virtue and wealth.
Two different roads are presented to us, equally leading to the attainment of this so
much desired object [the respect and admiration of mankind]; the one, by the study of
wisdom and the practice of virtue; the other, by the acquisition of wealth and greatness.
Two different characters are presented to our emulation; the one, of proud ambition
and ostentatious avidity; the other, of humble modesty and equitable justice. Two
different models, two different pictures, are held out to us, according to which we may
fashion our own character and behaviour; the one more gaudy and glittering in its
colouring; the other more correct and more exquisitely beautiful in its outline: the one
forcing itself upon the notice of every wandering eye; the other, attracting the attention
of scarce any body but the most studious and careful observer. (TMS I.iii.3.2: 62)
The difference between virtue and wealth is that wealth is more visible
and more easily recognizable than virtue. Indeed:
[our] fascination of greatness . . . is so powerful, that the rich and the great are too
often preferred to the wise and the virtuous. . . . The undistinguishing eye of the great
mob of mankind can well enough perceive the [plain and palpable difference of birth
and fortune]: it is with difficulty that the nice discernment of the wise and the virtuous
can sometimes distinguish the [the invisible and often uncertain difference of wisdom
and virtue]. (TMS VI.ii.1.20: 226)
Smith’s logic is the following.5 The approbation we receive depends on a
combination of our wealth and our virtue. An increase in wealth or an increase
4 On the diffusion of the idea that the individual’s drive to better his condition
generates positive social consequences see, among the large literature, Samuels
(2007).
5 For a formal model of the Smithian logic applied to the labour market, see Levy
(1999).
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in virtue increases approbation. Similarly, a decrease in wealth or a decrease in
virtue decreases approbation. A vicious act may not affect the extent to which
one is viewed with approval if the decrease in approbation due to immoral
conduct is compensated by an increase in approbation due to wealth. The
opposite is also true. But an increase or decrease in wealth is more recog-
nisable than an increase or decrease in virtue. So, large enough increases
in wealth more than compensate for immoral behaviours. Indeed, the
approbation offered to the rich, simply because of their wealth, is usually large
enough to overshadow many otherwise unapproved actions. The amount of
admiration offered to the rich may therefore induce individuals to engage in
the despicable breaking of formal and moral rules that allows them to parade
large amounts of material possessions. Smith indeed tells us that:
The candidates for fortune too frequently abandon the paths of virtues . . . They often
endeavour, therefore, not only by fraud and falsehood, the ordinary and vulgar arts of
intrigue and cabal; but sometimes by the perpetration of the most enormous crimes,
by murder and by assassination, by rebellion and civil war, to supplant and destroy
those who oppose or stand in the way of their greatness. (TMS I.iii.3.8: 64–5)
The gain from grossly immoral actions may be enormous admiration. So
people pursue wealth, when there is wealth to pursue, even at the cost of
disregarding moral and institutional rules, because it is easier to gain the
desired approbation by showing off material possessions than by behaving
virtuously. Indeed, by parading their wealth, the rich gain approbation
while their misbehaviours are ignored (TMS I.iii.3.2: 62).
Smith further develops the idea that we use a double standard for the
rich and for the poor. The same action, which is ‘regarded with the utmost
abhorrence and detestation’ when coming from poor ‘common people’, is
‘generally treated with a good deal of indulgence, and . . . easily either
excused or pardoned altogether’ when coming from the rich. We have
indeed ‘two different schemes or systems of morality current at the same
time; of which one may be called the strict or austere; the other the liberal,
or, if you will, the loose system’. The ‘loose’ moral system is used to judge
the rich, the ‘austere’ system to judge the poor (WN V.i.g.10: 794).
Smith also notices that the temptations to engage in reproachable
behaviours increase with society’s increase in sudden opportunities for
wealth accumulation, such as the ones that come with the opening of rich
international markets. Now there are plenty of things to buy and show off
(WN I.i.c.7: 181). We can distinguish ourselves from others by having
curious trinkets (TMS IV.i.8: 182) or ‘foreign wares, [which are preferred]
to cheaper and better goods of the same kind that were made at home
[merely because they are foreign]’ (WN IV.ii.41: 469). Today, we would
think in terms of electronic gadgets, sports cars, jewellery and designer
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garments, but the logic is the same: trinkets and baubles give us glamour.
Their consumption has no limits because ‘where [a person] can spend the
greatest revenue upon his own person, he frequently has no bound to his
expense, because he frequently has no bounds to his vanity, or to his
affection for his own person’ (WN III.iv.16: 422). The opening of rich
international markets offers both trinkets and opportunities to get them.
3. Some possible problems
Smith adds to the existing literature the warning that the prospect of
suddenly acquiring large amounts of wealth, because of the large gains in
approbation that follow, gives us strong enough incentives to disregard
moral and formal rules. The large amounts of wealth available with the
sudden enlargement of international trade, for example, generate strong
incentives to seek monopolistic rents, in a sense regardless of the existing
political regime. I think Smith would agree with Djankov et al. (2003) when
they suggest that looking at transition and development in terms of ‘the
best political system for economic reform’ (p. 597) may not be enough.6
The problems that Smith identifies, as we will see below, namely, rent-
seeking, public debt and factions, seem to afflict all political regimes.
Indeed, the opening of some transitioning and developing economies to
the rich and industrialised West today has enough in common with the
opening of colonial markets in the eighteenth century to make Smith’s fear
of the potential risks associated with the sudden presence of large amounts
of wealth relevant. Today, we often hear about Eastern European
corruption, where big industrial tycoons collude with politicians to fatten
their wallets while exploiting their struggling fellow-citizens and hindering
growth. We often hear about African politicians pocketing international aid
intended for starving sick children or for the construction of schools, and
fomenting civil wars to maintain their power to collect aid, de facto
sabotaging economic development. We often hear about some unscrupu-
lous businessman who is willing to risk the life of many children to get a few
extra pennies by selling abroad toys made with poisonous materials.
3.1. The rent-seeking problem
Where large profit opportunities are presented, they can become
exorbitant if a government grants monopoly privileges, and vain merchants
6 For some empirical studies on the relation between political forms and
development, see among others Heybey and Murrell (1999); Hausmann et al.
(2005); Rodrik (2008).
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and manufacturers can become voraciously ambitious and derail economic
growth (WN IV.viii.c.43: 604). Indeed, because of the incentives offered by
sudden vast wealth, merchants and manufacturers are driven by their
‘mean rapacity, monopolizing spirit, [and] interested sophistry . . . [which]
confounded the common sense of mankind. Their interest is, in this
respect, directly opposite to that of the great body of the people’ (WN
IV.iii.c.9–10: 493–4). Under these circumstances, they are ‘an order of men
whose interest is never exactly the same with the public, who generally have
an interest to deceive and even oppress the public, and who accordingly
have, upon many occasions, both deceived and oppressed it’ (WN I.xi: 10,
267). Smith spends most of book IV explaining the damages of rent-seeking
(see in particular, but not only, WN IV.i.10: 434, IV.ii.38: 467, IV.iii.c.10:
493), as Jerry Evensky (2005) has highlighted.7
As mentioned previously, this is not the place to question whether Smith
is correct or not, whether in his day or today. Herein, I would just like to
provide a possible way to view how Smith presents his argument. According
to Smith, merchants and manufacturers are willing to ignore the existing
rules and institutions because, thanks to monopoly powers, they will gain a
lot of wealth and therefore improve their position in the eyes of others. So,
with morally questionable means, they either flatter or ‘intimidate the
legislature’ to gain monopoly privileges. The consequent mercantilist laws
can be so unjust that:
the cruellest of our revenue laws, I will venture to affirm, are mild and gentle, in
comparison of some of those which the clamour of our merchants and manufacturers
has extorted from the legislature, for the support of their own absurd and oppressive
monopolies. Like the laws of Draco, these laws may be said to be all written in blood.
(WN IV.viii.17: 648)
In fact, Smith tells us, great merchants and manufacturers are willing
and able to ‘extort’ tragic international wars from the legislature, ‘[f]or
the sake of that little enhancement of price which this monopoly
might afford our producers’ (WN IV.viii.53: 661). Their great material
gain makes us forgive and forget the objectionable methods used to win
them.
Additionally, not only do rent-seekers destroy the benefits and progress
of trade, they fool the common people into supporting the rent-seekers:
That it was the spirit of monopoly which originally invented and propagated this
doctrine [of government-granted economic privileges], cannot be doubted; and
they who first taught it were by no means such fools as they who believed it.
7 For a recent example of looking at Smith to see the political agenda driving his
analysis, see Hueckel (2009).
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In every country it always is and must be the interest of the great body of the
people to buy whatever they want of those who sell it cheapest. The proposition
is so very manifest, that it seems ridiculous to take any pains to prove it; nor
could it have been called in question, had not the interested sophistry of
merchants and manufacturers confounded the common sense of mankind
(WN IV.iii.c.10: 493–4)
Smith’s conclusion is that rent-seekers permanently mutilate commerce.
Once privileges are granted, they will not be taken away.8 Smith is con-
vinced that:
[t]o expect, indeed, that the freedom of trade should ever be entirely restored in
Great Britain, is as absurd as to expect that an Oceana or Utopia should ever be
established in it. Not only the prejudices of the publick, but what is much more
unconquerable, the private interests of many individuals, irresistibly oppose it.
(WN IV.ii.43: 471)
The damage that great merchants and manufacturers inflict upon society
endures time and change.
In developed commercial societies, the damages of rent-seeking are
counterbalanced by the strength of the market. Smith tells us indeed that:
We must carefully distinguish between the effects of the colony trade and those
of the monopoly of that trade. The former are always and necessarily beneficial;
the latter always and necessarily hurtful. But the former are so beneficial, that
the colony trade, though subject to a monopoly, and notwithstanding the hurt-
ful effects of that monopoly, is still upon the whole beneficial, and greatly
beneficial; though a good deal less so than it would otherwise be. (WN IV.vii.c.47:
607–8)
Or again: ‘If the colony trade, however, even as it is carried out at present
is advantageous to Great Britain, it is not by the means of monopoly, but in
spite of the monopoly’ (WN IV.vii.c.50: 609). But in transitioning and
developing economies, commerce may not be strong and mature enough
to provide large enough benefits to compensate for the downsides of rent-
seeking. Today’s public choice analysis of transitioning and developing
countries tells a very similar story. The large gains from privileges in trade
with the rich West and generous foreign aid packages offer incredible rent-
seeking opportunities in some transitioning and developing countries,
which may permanently damage their economies. Rent-seeking indeed
seems to be one of the most aggressive and dangerous obstacles and threats
to growth in developing and transitioning economies, as Anne Krueger
8 For a formal treatment see Tullock (1975).
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(1974), Charles Rowley (2000) and David Hoffman (2002), among others,
have shown.
3.2. The public debt problem
Smith identifies a second menace applicable to transitioning and developing
economies: ‘sovereigns’ face the same vain temptations brought about by the
new available riches (WN V.iii.2–3: 908). The sovereign will spend his
revenue on frivolous trinkets during times of peace and will have to incur
debt to cover regular and unexpected expenditure. But unfortunately, ‘[t]he
progress of the enormous debts which at present oppress, and will in the
long run probably ruin, all the great nations of Europe, has been pretty
uniform’ (WN V.iii.10: 911). Despite the differences, one cannot avoid
thinking of the Philippines, Indonesia, Argentina, Romania and the many
other countries in which the ‘sovereigns’ and their families enriched
themselves with public funds and foreign aids, leaving their countries
bankrupt and dealing with the horrors of hyperinflation, even in the absence
of the need to increase expenditure to defend themselves from external
threats. The vanity of the politicians, then and now, creates incentives to
bypass moral and legal constraints, dangerously compromising growth.
3.3. Factions
Finally, even if factions are not directly related to the introduction of large
amounts of wealth, they are a further common point between Smith and
today’s developing and transitioning countries. Smith looks at factions as
loci where one can gain approbation by disregarding existing rules and
institutions, with potentially destabilising effects for society and growth.
Smith indeed condemns factions as ‘the [greatest] corrupters of moral
sentiments’ (TMS III.3.43: 156).
People join factions in civil and religious wars for the sake of vain glory
and immediate approbation (TMS III.3.42: 154–5). A group can become a
self-referential source of a moral code, or binding social capital as we would
say today, at the potential expense of social peace and harmony and at the
risk of many deaths (TMS III.3.43: 155), including the death of functioning
institutions. For the individual, the benefits of receiving the approbation of
the members of one’s faction are much larger than the cost of using
dreadful methods to promote one’s faction’s victory. Unfortunately, today’s
events seem to confirm Smith’s analysis and corroborate the detrimental
effects that factions may have on economic growth, especially when a strong
ethnic component is added, in countries where the economy is not stable
enough to sustain continuous growth.
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4. A Smithian framework for analysing possible solutions for transitioning
and developing economies
Smith’s diagnosis of some of the evils in his time can be used to diagnose
some of the evils that some transitioning and developing economies face in
our time. His prognosis may be applied to us today as well. He claims:
Commerce and manufactures can seldom flourish in any state which does not enjoy a
regular administration of justice, in which the people do not feel themselves secure in
the possession of their property, in which the faith of contracts is not supported by
law, and in which the authority of the state is not supposed to be regularly employed
in enforcing the payment of debts from all those who are able to pay. Commerce and
manufactures, in short, can seldom flourish in any state in which there is not a certain
degree of confidence in the justice of government. (WN V.iii.7: 910)
In addition to the attention given to market formation and institution
building, Smith would encourage transitioning and developing economies
to pay great attention to situations in which our vanity may induce us to
trump good formal or moral rules and institutions. The snatching of large
amounts of wealth that is up for grabs would most likely be his first priority.
In fact, Smith offers one explicit policy prescription: avoid rent-seeking, if
you can.
The legislature, were it possible that its deliberations could be always directed, not by
the clamourous importunity of partial interests, but by an extensive view of the
general good, ought upon this very account, perhaps, to be particularly careful
neither to establish any new monopolies of this kind, nor to extend further those
which are already established. Every such regulation introduces some degree of real
disorder into the constitution of the state, which it will be difficult afterwards to cure
without occasioning another disorder. (WN IV.ii.44: 471–2)
Smith’s advice sounds like some contemporary advice. Acemoglu (2008)
claims, in fact, that:
Every policy intervention creates winners and losers. The winners not only gain
economically, but also become politically powerful. These politically powerful groups
can then become a barrier against further progress. This is well illustrated by the
experience of import substitution, which supported nascent industrial groups in
many developing economies. In most cases, the subsidized conglomerates were highly
inefficient and became a formidable obstacle to further reform.
His advice: ‘Refrain from policies that will create new and potentially
dangerous political constituencies’ (p. 5).
But how can it be possible to refrain? How can it be possible for the
legislature to not be directed by ‘the clamourous importunity of partial
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interests’? Smith appeals to the legislator, claiming that he should not fall
for the flattery of the self-interested merchants but should preserve the
natural system of liberty out of reverence toward its beauty.9 But our civic
spirit is generally weak (TMS IV.1.11). So how can it be strengthened?
Additionally, if a ‘regular administration of justice’ is needed for commerce
to flourish, how do we get this ‘justice of government’, which is so deeply
missing in most transitioning and developing countries?
One can infer at least two suggestions from Smith’s work. One is to avoid
situations that may generate rent-seeking opportunities, as we just saw. The
other is to develop a strong sense of moral respect for rules, for institutions
and for the public good. Both of these prescriptions collapse into only one:
the gradual introduction of commerce. A gradual opening of the large
wealth offered by international trade restrains rent-seeking opportunities
and is likely to develop sound institutions and a strong moral sense that
leads to respect for them. Smith indeed tells us that a just set of institutions
and a public spirit do not come from any human wisdom, plan or design.
They are not something that can be imposed from above or from the
outside. They are something that comes, gradually, with commerce. Only
commerce, when very gradually introduced, can ignite what no army or
wisdom is able to start (WN III.iv.10: 418, WN V.i.g. 24–25: 803).
Smith claims indeed that it is from the gradual introduction of
commerce that we generate both a strong set of institutions and the
conditions that develop a strong moral sense, which would be fertile ground
for prosperity. He credits David Hume for being the first to realise that
‘commerce and manufactures gradually introduced order and good
government, and with them, the liberty and security of individuals. . . . This,
though it has been the least observed, is by far the most important of all their
effects’ (WN III.iv.4: 412; see also Rosenberg 1968, 1990; Rasmussen 2006).
It is, therefore, the gradual introduction of commerce and manufactures
that unintentionally generates the regular administration of justice – the
foundation of commercial prosperity – and the internalisation of its rules
may help develop the strong moral sense needed to countervail the strong
temptations of monopolies. ‘The gradual improvements of arts, manufac-
turers, and commerce’ not only is the foundation of good institutions but
also of the much-needed sense of respect for them.
The Smithian idea of the gradual introduction of commerce being so
beneficial for stable development – and his criticism of the sudden
introduction of large amounts of wealth that can be grabbed by rapacious
big merchants and manufacturers – enhance the idea of gradualism already
present in the transition and development literature, as in Mancur Olson
9 For a recent treatment, see Evensky, (2005) and Hanley and Paganelli (2009).
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(1963) and Peter Murrell (1992). Smith would add to it the role of
approbation and the size of the stakes available. The gradual introduction
of small amounts of wealth would reduce the incentives for immoral and
shameful grabbing and for disrespecting rules, as the gain in approbation
from material wealth may not be as large as the loss of approbation due to
breaking the rules of appropriate conduct. Even Smith’s example of ‘fast’
economic growth – America – implies pretty small incremental profit
opportunities. America has grown so much and so ‘fast’ because its growth
is based on agriculture and abundance of land, and cultivating abundant
land, in Smith’s time, was not going to change one’s fortune overnight. On
the other hand, large wealth available thanks to monopoly privileges would
increase the incentive to disregard rules and institutions to grab the riches
and increase the opportunity to be looked up at by others. Vanity combined
with large amounts of sudden wealth increase the incentive to ignore
institutional and moral rules and to commit despicable and economically
deleterious acts.
With this, by no means am I suggesting that Smith would encourage
isolationism. To the contrary, the exposure to international trade is
fundamental in Smith’s logic. I am simply saying that he may suggest a
gradual exposure to small profit opportunities rather than abstaining
or jumping at once at huge amounts of wealth. The slow introduction of
small profits would facilitate the gradual introduction of commerce so
commonly linked with the increased chances to generate successful
institutions and help develop the moral sense that is required to support
them.
That Smith favours gradualism can be inferred not only from the
abovementioned description of the emergence of the most successful
economies of his time but also from some of his policy prescriptions for
them. Too-sudden political changes are dangerous because they do not
allow enough time for adjustment. So when talking about the possibility of
liberalising international trade, he vocally calls for gradualism: ‘To open
the colony trade all at once to all nations, might not only occasion some
transitory inconveniency, but a great permanent loss to the greater part of
those whose industry or capital is at present engaged in it’ (WN IV.vii.c.44:
606). Commerce, and international commerce in particular, should be
pursued, always. But gradually. So he prescribes that:
a moderate and gradual relaxation of the laws . . . seems to be the only
expedient . . . which, by gradually diminishing one branch of her industry and
gradually increasing all the rest, can by degrees restore all the different branches of it
to that natural, healthful, and proper proportion which perfect liberty necessarily
establishes, and which perfect liberty can alone preserve. (WN IV.vii.c.44: 606; see also
WN IV.ii.40: 469)
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As for public debt, Smith tells us that the gradual introduction of
commerce may also provide remedies against its abuses, more effectively
than when sudden changes of wealth are present.10 Smith claims that if a
stable and developed commercial state ‘commonly brings along with it the
necessity of borrowing, it likewise brings along with it the facility of doing
so’ (WN V.iii.5: 910).
The problem of factions is the least related to commerce. Yet Smith
draws ideas for possible solutions from markets. If factions, such as religious
sects, are multiplied so much as to render each one of them too weak to
affect national policies, then factions may cease to be a threat to develop-
ment and may actually help the moral formation of individuals. Smith
claims indeed that factions can be ‘the most splendid opportunities for the
display of public spirit’ (TMS VI.ii.2.13: 232) and ‘the best schools of self-
command’ (VI.iii.12: 241, as well as TMS VI.iii.19–20: 245–246; see also
TMS VI.ii.2.13–14: 232).
The counterweight against the growth-detrimental threats that Smith
describes seems therefore to be a combination of a strong moral sense and
the gradual development of commerce itself (WN IV.vii.c.47–54: 607–10).
The two seem to develop symbiotically. A moral path may be more easily
followed in a society where the growth of commerce is gradual, possibly
because the number of questionable shortcuts available is not high. The
slow yet steady introduction of commerce, with its small yet steady profit
opportunities, may facilitate the habit of justice. The person who enriches
himself through honest hard work rather than by dishonest shortcuts
indeed gains:
that eminent esteem with which all men naturally regard a steady perseverance in
the practice of frugality, industry, and application, though directed to no other
purpose than the acquisition of fortune. . . . We not only approve, therefore, but
in some measure admire his conduct, and think it worthy of a considerable degree
of applause. It is the consciousness of this merited approbation and esteem
which alone is capable of supporting the agent in this tenour of conduct
(TMS IV.2.8:189–90)
Also, the economy grows in a healthy fashion (TMS, IV.1.9–10: 183–4).
5. Conclusions
Some transitioning and developing economies have much in common with
the economies described by Adam Smith, where large profit opportunities
10 For a recent analysis of Smith’s position on public debt, see Paganelli (2006).
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are suddenly introduced. Smith adds to the transition and development
analysis our natural vanity and payoffs measured in approbation. The desire
for approbation makes individuals and society better off under most
circumstances. But it can also destroy opportunities for growth. If there are
enough incentives to rely only on wealth to receive approbation, then good
institutions, the rule of law and moral conduct may be ignored, generating
some of the malfunctions we observe today in some non-developed
countries. Smith can explain eighteenth-century mercantilist policies and
could explain twentieth-century rent-seeking and corruption in some
transitioning and developing countries as a consequence of our vain
attempts to show off in front of others. Hope, from Smith, may be inferred
through his analysis of the gradual introduction of commerce, its con-
sequential fair administration of justice and the development of morality
and civic spirit that may be able to constrain those rent-seekers who are so
detrimental to growth.
Smith may not be able to explain all failures or successes in developing
and transitioning countries, but he can still offer us an effective framework
that enhances our existing means of analysis.
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Abstract
If Adam Smith were asked about transitioning and developing economies
today, one may infer, he might suggest introducing small, yet constant,
opportunities for wealth accumulation, avoiding the sudden accumulation
of riches. Good institutions and the moral rules often needed to comply
with them are more likely to be disregarded if there are large, sudden
material gains, such as new wealth generated by the sudden opening of
markets or government granting monopolies. For Smith, the desire to show
off in front of others can inhibit moral behaviour and respect for good
institutions, generating perverse incentives that hinder growth. Gradual
change is to be preferred.
Keywords
Adam Smith, developing economies, transitioning economies, gradualism,
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